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1 Introduction
Preferential market access is known to stimulate goods trade among insider
countries relative to outsider countries on average (see Baier and Bergstrand
2007, 2009). Previous empirical research on the direct effect of preferentialism
on countries’ trade relied on the paradigm that, in the policy domain, only
preferential goods market access matters for goods trade. But preferentialism
extends beyond the boundaries of goods trade: many recent trade agreements
contain provisions for goods trade, services trade, and investment (see Horn,
Mavroidis, and Sapir 2010; Baldwin 2011); services and goods trade are comple-
mentary and often even hard to disentangle (see Baldwin 2011); and foreign
investment activities of multinational firms are complementary to goods trade
(see Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple 2004; Ekholm, Forslid, and Markusen 2007),
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so that provisions about services or investment matter for goods trade (see Egger
and Wamser 2013).1 Hence, preferential market access for each goods, services,
and investments should matter for goods trade. Preferential market access
provisions are traditionally implemented by way of four types of preferential
agreements: goods trade agreements (GTAs), services trade agreements (STAs),
bilateral or multilateral investment agreements (BITs), and double taxation
agreements (DTTs) (see Egger and Wamser 2013). Empirically, there is overlap
in those provisions for two reasons: some country-pairs sign independent agree-
ments in the different dimensions with each other, and others implement deep
integration agreements (mostly associated with customs unions) which provide
provisions in several domains (goods, services, cross-border investment, etc.).
From a theoretical point of view, we would expect non-goods-trade provi-
sions to affect goods trade positively if, on net, other affected outcomes are
complementary to goods trade (e.g. through the complementarity of services
trade and goods trade or the complementarity of foreign direct investment and
goods trade). Examples are transport services and goods trade, financial services
and goods trade, or the activity of vertical multinational firms and goods
trade. Such complementarities may surface across firms (through interdepen-
dencies established by the market) or within firms. One would expect, on the
other hand, a substitutive relationship between non-goods-trade provisions and
goods trade, if service trade activities or foreign direct investment would com-
pete with goods trade for similar resources (e.g. production factors or consumer
expenditures).
Rather than focusing on the impact of one dimension of preferentialism
(namely, GTAs) on bilateral goods trade, this article assesses the (causal) impact
of the scope of preferentialism on goods trade — measured by the considered
(most important) four dimensions in which preferential market access can be
granted between a pair of countries. We utilize panel data on all GTAs, STAs,
BITs, and DTTs among 210 countries between 1960 and 2005 (covering 2,018,940
1 In general, there is heterogeneity about any type of agreements regarding the extent of market
access and the so-called preference margins granted across different activities (goods with
goods trade, services with services trade, and investment-related activities with foreign direct
investment). We account for such heterogeneity to the extent that we distinguish between
agreements that contain goods trade provisions only, ones that capture goods and services
trade provisions, ones that capture goods and investment provisions, and ones that capture
goods, services, and investment provisions. However, even GTAs with goods provisions only
differ with regard to the tariff lines (products) covered and the preference margins granted (i.e.
the difference between the applied tariff outside the agreement and the one charged within the
agreement). Accounting for the latter type of heterogeneity lies beyond the scope of this article
(see Baier and Bergstrand, 2004, 2007, and 2009, for a similar approach in that regard).
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observations and 43,890 country-pairs).2 Based on those data, we define an
ordered index, ranging from 0 to 4, reflecting the number of dimensions in
which preferential market access is granted in a pair of countries. Notice that
any value from 1 to 3 is not unique in terms of the specific types of agreements it
is based upon. No matter of whether a GTA, an STA, a BIA, or a DTT is
concluded in isolation, the scope of preferentialism is always 1 and refers to
the average effect of any single type of agreement, and similarly for a scope of 2
or 3. We then estimate the probabilities of granting preferential market access in
the 0–4 dimensions as a function of economic, geographical, and political
fundamentals for every country-pair and year. Finally, we utilize the estimated
probabilities in a selection-on-observables framework to estimate the causal
effect of a broader versus a narrower scope of preferentialism on bilateral
goods trade for the average treated country-pair and year.
It is worth noting that preferentialism of any kind — not only in the goods
trade domain — evolved particularly dynamically since the early 1990s. Hence, a
panel data-set of country-pairs which starts as early as 1960 contains numerous
zeros (no type of preferentialism is granted at all), in particular, in the earlier
(especially the first three) covered decades. Accordingly, not any form of prefer-
ential market access is granted in 86% of the observations covered, which implies
that the probability of drawing a zero-ordered index across all years and country-
pairs is 86%. About 11% of the observations have one type of agreement (grant a
scope of 1), about 2.5% grant a scope of 2, only 0.59% and less than 0.001% grant
preferentialism in three and four dimensions. As said before, there is a tendency
toward a broader scope of preferentialism for the average country-pair as time
marches on: in 10,463 year-to-year comparisons, country-pairs increased the
scope of preferentialism, while in only 324 year-to-year comparisons, country-
pairs reduced the scope of preferentialism (the rest are non-changers since 1960).
Tables 1 and 2 present numbers for the intensive and extensive country
margins of goods exports between country-pairs for different scopes of prefer-
entialism in the whole panel (Table 1) and for the most recent year covered,
namely 2005 (Table 2). On average, positive trade tends to be more likely and
bigger between country-pairs with more preferentialism than between ones with
less preferentialism. The lower panels of Tables 1 and 2 suggest that bilateral
exports were non-zero for about 61% and about 78% of the observations in the
2 Many GTAs include services trade and investment provisions. For instance, this is obvious
from a new data-set compiled by the World Trade Organization. In accordance with that data-
set, we classify country-pairs to have services trade provisions whenever they appear in a GTA
or a separate STA. Similarly, we classify country-pairs to have investment provisions no matter
whether they appear in a trade agreement or a bilateral investment agreement.
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whole panel and in 2005, respectively. Moreover, these panels show that bilat-
eral exports were non-zero for about 57% and 71% of the observations in the
whole panel and in 2005, respectively, with no preferentialism granted whatso-
ever. Finally, these panels show that bilateral exports were non-zero for more
than 87% and 93% of the observations in the whole panel and in 2005, respec-
tively, with some preferentialism granted (scope 1). The upper panels demon-
strate that bilateral goods exports (measured in logs) increase as the scope of
preferential agreements increases. At the same time, the number of observations
the calculated mean values are based upon decreases in the scope.
Figures 1–3 provide evidence of the average scope of preferentialism per
country. In order to be able to draw maps, we compute the average scope per
country across all partners in three different years: 1965, 1985, and 2005. Notice
that, while the original scope variable is an integer which takes on values
between 0 and 4, the average across a country’s partners in a year leads to a
real number which is bounded from below by 0 and from above by 4. That
number may be higher due to broadening the set of partners with which a
country entertains a low scope of preferentialism or by raising the scope with
Table 1: Intensive and extensive country margin of goods exports over all years (1960–2005).
Scope of preferential
agreements
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
Intensive margin
0 0.316 2.972 −6.908 11.896 269,147
1 2.474 3.163 −6.908 12.236 51,062
2 4.205 2.555 −6.908 11.997 13,202
3 5.768 2.076 −1.822 12.602 3,247
4 6.308 1.599 1.785 9.846 492
All 0.857 3.195 −6.908 12.602 337,150
Extensive margin
0 0.568 0.495 0 1 473,489
1 0.867 0.340 0 1 58,911
2 0.968 0.176 0 1 13,637
3 0.998 0.043 0 1 3,253
4 1.000 0.000 1 1 492
All 0.613 0.487 0 1 549,782
Notes: The Scope of Preferential Agreements is a count of the number of preferential integration
agreement dimensions covered between country-pairs. Preferential market access is measured in four
dimensions: GTAs; STAs; Double Taxation Treaties (DTTs); and Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs).
Data on bilateral goods trade are taken from the United Nations’ Comtrade Database. The intensive
bilateral (country) margin is the log of the bilateral goods exports between country-pairs. The
extensive bilateral (country) margin measures the propensity to observe positive goods trade.
Numbers are calculated using all available country-pairs and years.
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a given number of preferential trading partners. In the figures, we use blue color
allotted to five quantiles of the distribution of the average scope of preferenti-
alism across countries, where a darker color indicates a bigger average scope
and a lighter color indicates the opposite. The figures suggest that developed
countries were faster in granting preferential market access – mostly vis-à-vis
.0047847 – .0047847
.0334928 – .15311
.0095694 – .0143541
0
.0047847 – .0095694
.0143541 – .0334928
Figure 1: Avg. scope of preferentialism by country (1965).
Table 2: Intensive and extensive country margin of goods exports in 2005.
Scope of preferential
agreements
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
Intensive margin
0 0.113 3.234 −6.908 10.226 8,129
1 2.743 3.242 −6.908 12.236 2,676
2 4.559 2.738 −6.908 11.467 1,136
3 5.929 2.042 0.515 12.602 392
4 6.628 1.547 2.324 9.846 122
All 1.330 3.635 −6.908 12.602 12,455
Extensive margin
0 0.707 0.455 0 1 11,500
1 0.927 0.261 0 1 2,888
2 0.990 0.098 0 1 1,147
3 0.997 0.050 0 1 393
4 1.000 0.000 1 1 122
All 0.776 0.417 0 1 16,050
Notes: The Scope of Preferential Agreements is a count of the number of preferential integration
agreement dimensions covered between country-pairs. Preferential market access is measured in four
dimensions: GTAs; STAs; DTTs; and BITs. Data on bilateral goods trade are taken from the United Nations’
Comtrade Database. The intensive bilateral (country) margin is the log of the bilateral goods exports
between country-pairs. The extensive bilateral (country) margin measures the propensity to observe
positive goods trade. Numbers are calculated using all available country-pairs for the year 2005.
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each other – than developing countries. This is evident from the numerous
countries that are colored white in the map for 1965. The later years of the
data display a significant involvement of developing countries in preferential-
ism, mostly with developed economies but also among each other. The latter
shows in the larger number of colored countries in the map for 2005 relative to
the ones for 1965 and 1985.
.0047847 − .0095694 .0095694 − .0334928
.0334928 − .0574163 .0574163 − .1148325
.1148325 − .8133971 0
Figure 2: Avg. scope of preferentialism by country (1985).
.0047847 − .0526316 .0526316 − .1100478
.1100478 − .277512 .277512 − .5454546
.5454546 − 1.832536 0
Figure 3: Avg. scope of preferentialism by country (2005).
Notes: The figures illustrate the average scope of preferentialism across a country’s partners in
a year, which is a real number that is bounded from below by 0 and from above by 4. That
number may be higher due to broadening the set of partners with which a country entertains a
low scope of preferentialism or by raising the scope with a given number of preferential trading
partners. White color refers to a scope of preferentialism of 0 and blue color to one of five
quantiles of a positive average scope of preferentialism across countries.
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2 Modeling the effects of an endogenous scope of
preferentialism
Let us suppose that the scope of preferentialism between countries i and j in year
t is determined by a latent process of the form
Yijt ¼ Xijtβ þ uijt; ½1
where Yijt measures the (latent) net gains from preferentialism, Xijt is a 1  K
vector of observable determinants of the scope of preferentialism, β is a vector of
parameters (including pair-specific fixed effects and time-specific effects),3 and
uijt is a disturbance term. We assume that uijt is normally distributed and eq. [1]
can be estimated by way of an ordered panel probit model (see Wooldridge
2002). Yijt is assumed to generate an ordered index for the scope of preferenti-
alism as Sijt ¼ 0 if Yijt  μ1 ¼ 0; Sijt ¼ 1 if 0 < Yijt  μ2; . . . ; Sijt ¼ 4 if μ3 < Yijt;
where μs are constants for s 2 f1; . . . ; 3g .
Apart from fixed pair and time effects, Xijt includes variables that have been
found to be important for selection into the types of preferential agreements
included here. These variables reflect country size (absolute and relative) factor
endowments, trade and investment costs in a broad sense, and political costs.4
Table 3 defines the corresponding variables and mentions their data sources. We
suppress descriptive statistics of observables here for the sake of brevity.
3 We follow the Mundlak-Chamberlain-Wooldridge device to parameterize fixed pair effects as
an additive function of averaged time-variant covariates in Xijt (see Mundlak 1978; Chamberlain
1982; Wooldridge 2002).
4 In the following, we provide a highly selective list of examples of work in economics which
focused on the determinants or consequences of just one dimension of preferential market
access.
Work on the causes of agreements. GTAs-theory: Baldwin (1995, 1997); Bond and Syropoulos
(1996); Limao and Tovar Rodriguez (2011); Arcand, Olarreaga, and Zoratto (2010); GTAs-
empirics: Magee (2003); Baier and Bergstrand (2004); Bergstrand, Egger, and Larch (2010);
STAs-theory: Huang, Whalley, and Zhang (2009); STAs-empirics: Egger and Lanz (2008);
Francois and Hoekman (2010); Egger and Wamser (2013); BITs-theory: Egger, Larch, and
Pfaffermayr (2007a, b); BITs-empirics: Bergstrand and Egger (2011); DTTs-theory: Davies
(2003, 2004); DTTs-empirics: Egger, Larch, Pfaffermayr, and Winner (2006).
Work on the consequences of agreements. GTAs-theory: Frankel, Stein, and Wei (1995);
Freund (2000); Ornelas (2005a–c); Limao (2007); Karacaovali and Limao (2008); GTAs-empirics:
Baier and Bergstrand (2007, 2009); Egger et al. (2011); STAs-theory: Huang, Whalley, and Zhang
(2009); STAs-empirics: Egger, Larch, and Staub (2012); BITs-theory: Egger, Larch, and
Pfaffermayr (2004, 2007a,b); BITs-empirics: Egger and Merlo (2012); Sauvant and Sachs
(2009); DTTs-theory: Davies, Egger, and Egger (2010); DTTs-empirics: Blonigen and Davies
(2004); Egger et al. (2006); Davies, Norbäck, and Tekin-Koru (2009).
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Table 3: Determinants of preferentialism (description and data sources).
SumGDPijt Defined as ln GDPijt with GDPijt  ðGDPit þ GDPjtÞ, where GDPit is a
country’s real GDP in U.S. dollars of the year 2000 (Source: World Bank’s
World Development Indicators, WDI).
SimGDPijt Defined as ln½1 ðGDPit=GDPijtÞ2  ðGDPjt=GDPijtÞ2 (Source: WDI).
SumPOPijt Defined analogous to SumGDPijt , except for using population numbers
POPit and POPjt instead of GDPit and GDPjt , respectively (Source: WDI).
SimPOPijt Constructed akin to SimGDPijt (Source: WDI).
DKLijt Capturing the difference in two countries’ relative factor endowments,
measured as j lnðGDPit=POPitÞ  lnðGDPjt=POPjtÞj (Source: WDI).
DKL2ijt The squared value of DKLijt (Source: WDI).
Remoteijt The average distance of two countries i and j from all other countries
in the sample in a given year t. Defined as 0:5f½lni 6¼j Dij=ðNt  1Þþ
lnj 6¼i Dij=ðNt  1Þjg (see Baier and Bergstrand, 2004), where Nt is the
number of countries in the sample as of year t.
DRowKLijt The average difference in relative factor endowments (real per-capita
incomes) of pair ij together with all other countries in the sample in a
given year t (see Egger and Larch, 2008).
logDistanceij The log of the great circle distance (ln Dij) between two countries’
economic centers (Source: Centre dÉtudes Prospectives et d’Informations
Internationales, CEPII).
Common Borderij An indicator variable for a common land border of i and j (Source: CEPII).
Common
Languageij
An indicator variable for a common language of i and j (Source: CEPII).
Same Continentij An indicator variable for i and j being located on the same continent
(Source: CEPII).
WTO Memberijt
(one)
Unity whenever only one country in a pair is a member of the GATT or the
WTO in year t and zero else (Source: Egger and Nelson, 2010).
WTO Memberijt
(both)
Unity whenever both countries in a pair are members of the GATT or the
WTO in year t and zero else (Source: Egger and Nelson, 2010).
Landlockedij (one) An indicator variable for i or j to have maritime access (Source: CEPII).
Landlockedij (both) An indicator variable for i and j to have maritime access (Source: CEPII).
CDWarijt Counts the number of days i and j had armed conflict with each other since
after World War II (Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies’
Armed Conflict Database).
DiffYearWarijt Counts of the number of years since i and j had the last war with each
other. If two countries never had a war, the variable is set to a maximum
value of 2005 (Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Armed
Conflict Database).
DiffRegDurijt A count of the absolute difference in the number of years two countries’
political regimes are in office (Source: Marshall and Jaggers’ Polity IV
database).
DiffPolFreedijt Measures the absolute difference in the Polity 2 index, which is larger if a
country’s political freedom is greater (Source: Marshall and Jaggers’ Polity
IV database).
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Table 4 summarizes the parameter estimates from four variants of an
ordered panel probit model involving a latent process as in eq. [1]. Broadly,
the results suggest that the scope of preferentialism between country-pairs
increases in countries’ size (economic and cultural) similarity, and geographical
closeness. All specifications employ fixed country–pair effects by way of includ-
ing means of the time-variant variables, following the Mundlak–Chamberlain–
Wooldridge device as well as fixed year effects by way of including binary
indicator variables.5
5 In principal, all time-invariant variables and their parameters in Table 4 could be thought of
as being part of the vector of country-pair fixed effects. However, we report the corresponding
parameters for convenience. Moreover, one could allow for continent-specific or even country-
specific year effects rather than pooled year effects. With the data at hand, this leads to an
extremely flat likelihood function which is difficult to optimize for parameter values. Therefore,
we resort to the more parsimonious specification.
Table 4: Determinants of preferentialism (estimation results).
Observable variables Base
specification
Alternative BITs
specification
Dynamic
specification
Additional
spillover
control
SumGDPijt 0.626*** 0.603*** 0.001 0.132***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.026) (0.024)
SimGDPijt 0.302*** 0.321*** 0.010 0.056***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.019) (0.017)
SumPOPijt 0.195*** 0.243*** −0.012 −0.023
(0.016) (0.016) (0.030) (0.027)
SimPOPijt −0.795*** −0.778*** −0.232*** −0.338***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.033) (0.031)
DKLijt 0.024 −0.008 0.059** 0.034
(0.016) (0.015) (0.026) (0.024)
DKL2ijt −0.111*** −0.103*** −0.065*** −0.062***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
Remoteij −1.237*** −0.305** −0.752*** −1.447***
(0.128) (0.128) (0.249) (0.237)
DRowKLijt −0.005 0.247*** 0.016 0.090***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.027) (0.026)
log Distanceij −0.382*** −0.352*** −0.212*** −0.197***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008)
(continued)
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The first model summarized is the base specification. The second model utilizes
an alternative treatment of investment provisions (or BITs). While the base
model codes preferential investment provisions as to apply no matter of whether
they surface in a (goods or services) trade agreement or in a BIT, the alternative
Table 4: (Continued)
Observable variables Base
specification
Alternative BITs
specification
Dynamic
specification
Additional
spillover
control
Common Borderij 0.159*** 0.189*** −0.025 −0.015
(0.013) (0.013) (0.026) (0.026)
Common Languageij 0.208*** 0.211*** 0.093*** 0.116***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.012) (0.012)
Same Continentij 0.120*** 0.190*** 0.091*** 0.102***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.012)
WTO Memberijt (one) 0.506*** 0.535*** 0.339*** 0.298***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.025) (0.023)
WTO Memberijt (both) 0.812*** 0.854*** 0.507*** 0.462***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.029) (0.027)
Landlockedij (one) −0.077*** −0.101*** −0.032*** −0.052***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.011)
Landlockedij (both) −0.050*** −0.079*** 0.011 0.005
(0.015) (0.016) (0.030) (0.028)
CDWarijt −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DiffYearWarijt −0.000*** −0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DiffRegDurijt 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DiffPolFreedijt −0.011*** −0.010*** −0.003*** −0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 654,272 654,272 641,210 641,210
Notes:Orderedpanel probit estimates. All specifications includepair-specificmeans and year effects. ***,
**, and * indicate that coefficients are significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
The base specification uses a BIT indicator which is set to unity not only for cases where a BIT actually
exists but also in case that a trade agreement provides for investment provisions according to the World
Trade Organization. In the alternative BITs specification, only existing BITs are counted. The dynamic
specification includes the dependent variable with a one-year time lag along with initial conditions
according to Wooldridge (2005). The parameters on the lagged dependent variables and the initial
conditions are suppressed for the sake of brevity. The last specification with additional spillover controls
conditions additionally on the lagged total scope of preferentialism in a year (sum over all country-pairs)
minus the scope of preferentialism of the country-pair under consideration relative to the total number of
observations minus one ðWSijt1 ¼ 1=ðN  1Þkl6¼ij;t1Skl;t1Þ.
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specification focuses on actual BITs only. This reduces the integer number of the
scope of preferentialism for some of the country-pairs by one unit. The third
specification adds a lagged dependent variable and controls for its endogeneity
by including an initial condition as suggested by Wooldridge (2005). Not sur-
prisingly, it turns out that there is inertia in the scope of preferentialism that
country-pairs grant each other, reflected in a positive parameter point estimate
which is significantly different from zero (suppressed in Table 4 for the sake of
brevity). Finally, the fourth specification adds the once-lagged average scope of
preferentialism in other country-pairs than ij as a determinant of pair ij’s pre-
ferentialism in a given year. Since the last two specifications involve lagged
terms, they are based on fewer observations than the first two specifications in
Table 4. It turns out that the scope of preferentialism is contagious (the para-
meter is suppressed in Table 4 for the sake of brevity), akin to goods trade
preferentialism (see Egger and Larch 2008). While there is some difference in the
parameters across the specifications in Table 4, the estimated probabilities are
very similar. Hence, we proceed by using the base specification for estimating
average treatment effects of the treated below.
The ordered probit obtains five n  1 vectors of probabilities p0; . . . ; p4 for a
scope of s 2 f0; . . . ; 4g. In what follows, we utilize the probabilities to estimate
average treatment effects on the treated (ATTs). For treatment s and control
group ~s 2 f0; . . . ; 4g, we may write the subvector probabilities as ps;~s and the
average treatment effects on the treated of the extensive and intensive country
margins as ATTEs;~s and ATT
I
s;~s, respectively. Defining an indicator variable for the
extensive country margin of bilateral trade, Eijt, which is unity whenever i
exports to j in year t and zero else and log bilateral exports for the intensive
country margin of bilateral trade, I ijt;ATTEs;~s ¼ EðEsijt  E~sijtjSijt ¼ s; ps;~sÞ and
ATTIs;~s ¼ EðI sijt  I~sijtjSijt ¼ s; ps;~sÞ.6
While outcomes Esijt and I sijt are observed for observation ijt in case it has
treatment s, counterfactual outcomes E~sijt and I~sijt have to be estimated (see
Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).7 For the estimates of ATTEs;~s and ATT
I
s;~s to be
consistent, we impose three common assumptions: conditional mean
6 The results in Egger, Larch, Staub, and Winkelmann (2011) suggest that these two margins
can be analyzed as two separate parts of an integrated model.
7 In general, endogenous treatment effects’ problems are ones of missing data. In our context,
say, a country-pair ij with a scope of preferentialism of unity in period t is only observed with
that treatment level. Ideally, we would like to compare this country-pair to itself with another
treatment level (say, one with a scope of preferentialism of four) in the same period. However,
such a data point does not exist. We can only impute (or estimate) it by finding other country-
pairs in the same year which are very similar (ideally, they are identical) to country-pair ij.
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independence holds (A1)8; observations with state s and control units with state ~s
have common support in ps;~s-space (A2)
9; and the scalar-valued propensity scores
in ps;~s are suitable measures of similarity between observations (similarity in ps;~s
for any pair of observations means similarity in all of the elements in observables
Xs;~s for that pair of observations; A3).
10 We enforce a high quality of matching in
two ways. First of all, we enforce similarity between the propensity scores of the
treated and matched control units by utilizing a narrow radius of 1% and caliper
matching based on a common support of propensity scores for the treated and
control units. Moreover, in selecting control observations with state ~s for treated
observations with state s which are similar in all columns of Xs;~s, we make sure
that Assumptions A2 and A3 hold (see Dorn and Egger, 2011). This ensures
similarity of all compared units in terms of Xs;~s as well as in the propensity scores.
3 Results
Before presenting treatment effects based on matching, we summarize parametric
average treatment effects based on fixed effects regressions. Baier and Bergstrand
(2007) – using panel data on bilateral exports and binary GTA indicators with 5-year
intervals between cross sections – employed fixed country-pair effects under the
assumption that the inclination toward selecting into a (goods) trade agreement
was relatively time-invariant. In this case, fixed country-pair effects would control
for the selection bias (see Wooldridge 1995, for a formal treatment of this assump-
tion). Tables 5 and 6 summarize the relevant coefficient estimates on two versions
of the discrete treatment variable of interest and all the controls included in Table 4.
One version of the treatment variable is a count variable as in Tables 1 and 2; which
was the dependent variable underlying the results in Table 4. This variable is
8 Similar to linear regression models, matching based on the propensity score requires that all
relevant variables are included in the model (so that the estimates – with matching, including
the propensity score – are consistent). Notice that Assumption Al is not testable.
9 For observations to be comparable, country-pairs with a specific treatment and control level
of the scope of preferentialism in a given year t should have overlapping probabilities of having
the same scope as the treated. Otherwise, the units would be too dissimilar to infer causal
treatment effects from.
10 Suppose units of observation with specific treatment and control levels of the scope of
preferentialism had similar, overlapping probabilities of exhibiting the level of treatment of the
treated but the respective determinants Xs;~s of those treatment probabilities would be very
dissimilar for units with treatment s versus ~s. Then, similarity in propensity scores would be an
artifact and not a compact measure of similarity in the underlying Xs;~s, which they are supposed
to be.
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Table 5: Average treatment effects in linear fixed effects models.
Outcome:
intensive
country
margin
Outcome:
intensive
country
margin
Outcome:
extensive
country
margin
Outcome:
extensive
country
margin
Scope of preferentialismijt 0.303*** −0.070***
(0.006) (0.001)
Treatment scope lijt 0.238*** −0.049***
(0.010) (0.002)
Treatment scope 2ijt 0.647*** −0.152***
(0.014) (0.003)
Treatment scope 3ijt 0.962*** −0.246***
(0.020) (0.004)
Treatment scope 4ijt 1.186*** −0.279***
(0.042) (0.007)
SumGDPijt 2.210*** 2.212*** 0.200*** 0.200***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.003) (0.003)
SimGDPijt 0.593*** 0.594*** 0.047*** 0.047***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.002) (0.002)
SumPOPijt −0.201*** −0.198*** 0.024*** 0.023***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.003) (0.003)
SimPOPijt 0.596*** 0.596*** 0.060*** 0.060***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.004) (0.004)
DKLijt −0.063*** −0.063*** −0.014*** −0.014***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.003) (0.003)
DKL2ijt −0.102*** −0.102*** 0.003*** 0.004***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001)
Remoteij 2.643*** 2.717*** 0.626*** 0.604***
(0.158) (0.159) (0.028) (0.028)
DRowKLijt −0.130*** −0.124*** −0.063*** −0.065***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.004) (0.004)
WTO Memberijt (one) −0.169*** −0.166*** 0.075*** 0.074
(0.018) (0.018) (0.003) (0.003)
WTO Memberijt (both) −0.133*** −0.129*** 0.145*** 0.145
(0.020) (0.020) (0.003) (0.003)
DiffRegDurijt −0.003*** −0.003*** −0.001*** −0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (.000) (0.000)
DiffPolFreedijt −0.011*** −0.011*** .001*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (.000) (0.000)
Observations 337,150 337,150 549,782 549,782
Country-pair effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pairs 15,993 15,993 17,606 17,606
Adj. R2 0.818 0.8181 0.5476 0.5478
Notes: OLS estimates. ***, **, and * indicate that coefficients are significantly different from zero at
1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Treatment scope 1 (2–4) is (are) dummy variable(s) indicating the
respective scope of preferential agreements of a country-pair.
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Table 6: Average treatment effects on goods export margins in linear fixed effects models
(additionally including continent-time effects).
Outcome:
intensive
country
margin
Outcome:
intensive
country
margin
Outcome:
extensive
country
margin
Outcome:
extensive
country
margin
Scope of preferentialismijt 0.272*** −0.069***
(0.006) (0.001)
Treatment scope lijt 0.228*** −0.047***
(0.010) 0.002
Treatment scope 2ijt 0.575*** −0.149***
(0.014) 0.004
Treatment scope 3ijt 0.835*** −0.247***
(0.020) 0.007
Treatment scope 4ijt 1.132*** −0.272***
(0.042) 0.017
SumGDPijt 2.383*** 2.383*** 0.228*** 0.228***
0.024 0.024 0.004 0.004
SimGDPijt 0.629*** 0.630*** 0.054*** 0.054***
0.015 0.015 0.002 0.002
SumPOPijt −0.002 −0.001 0.025*** 0.025***
0.018 0.018 0.003 0.003
SimPOPijt 0.506*** 0.505*** 0.086*** 0.087***
0.023 0.023 0.004 0.004
DKLijt −0.062*** −0.062*** −0.010*** −0.010***
0.019 0.019 0.003 0.003
DKL2ijt −0.114*** −0.114*** 0.001 0.001
0.006 0.006 0.001 0.001
Remoteij 4.774*** 4.785*** 0.658*** 0.656***
0.304 0.304 0.048 0.048
DRowKLijt 0.066*** 0.070*** −0.060*** −0.061***
0.024 0.024 0.004 0.004
WTO Memberijt (one) −0.101*** −0.100*** 0.077*** 0.077***
0.018 0.018 0.003 0.002
WTO Memberijt (both) −0.053*** −0.052*** 0.146*** 0.146***
0.020 0.020 0.003 0.003
DiffRegDurijt −0.003*** −0.003*** −0.001*** −0.001***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
DiffPolFreedijt −0.006*** −0.006*** 0.001*** 0.001***
0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
Observations 337,150 337,150 549,782 549,782
Country-pair effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continent-time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pairs 15,993 15,993 17,606 17,606
Adj. R2 0.822 0.822 0.550 0.550
Notes: OLS estimates. ***, **, and * indicate that coefficients are significantly different from zero at
1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Treatment scope 1 (2–4) is (are) dummy variable(s) indicating the
respective scope of preferential agreements of a country-pair.
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dubbed Scope of preferentialismijt in Tables 5 and 6. In a linear fixed country-pair
effects model, such a specification forces the impact of scope of preferentialism to
be linear. Therefore, alternatively, we employ four individual binary variables
simultaneously (with a zero scope being the reference category) in order to allow
for a nonlinear impact of a bigger scope of preferentialism as the scope changes
gradually from one to four. We employ two versions of these two specifications,
where one employs fixed common time effects (in Table 5) and another one allows
the time effects to be continent specific (in Table 6). Since there are always two
countries in a pair, there are two continent-specific year effects involved in the latter
case.11 With two export margins (intensive and extensive), two specifications of
functional form of the average treatment effect of the scope of preferentialism, and
two specifications of year fixed effects (common or continent-specific), there are
eight models altogether.
The results in Tables 5 and 6 support the following conclusions. First, the results
based on the scope measured by a count variable suggest a positive, linear relation-
ship between scope and the intensive margin of exports, but not the extensive
margin of exports. This holds true, no matter of whether time effects are specified
as common or specific to continents. A parameter of 0.272 in the models for log
bilateral exports means that trade is growing by 100·exp(0.272)—100% if the scope
of preferentialism grows by onemode. A parameter of –0.07 in the linear probability
models for positive exports means that the probability of positive exports declines
by seven percentage points if the scope of preferentialism grows by one mode.
Second, the results suggest that the semi-elasticity of the scope of preferentialism for
the intensivemargin of exports or the percentage point effect on the probability does
not progress linearly as the scope increases from zero up to four.
Two drawbacks of these estimates based on a linear model are that they
invoke relatively strong functional form assumptions regarding the impact of
treatment on outcome and that they do not impose strict support conditions. An
important consequence of these drawbacks is that the observations with differ-
ent treatment levels still differ in a nonlinear fashion with regard to the included
observables and are, in fact, not comparable. Moreover, the selection problem
might be time-variant (as are the observables determining selection) such that
the parameter estimates might be inconsistent. However, given the restrictions
of the fixed effect model, it has two advantages: the average treatment effects of
the treated are identical to the average treatment effects of the untreated which
facilitates the interpretation of the results; the estimates are based on a full
11 In principal, one could allow even for country-specific rather than continent-specific year
effects. However, with the data at hand, the model’s objective function is difficult to optimize
for parameter values in that case. Therefore, we resort to the more parsimonious specification.
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support of the data so that a quantitative comparison between any combination
of treatment levels is straightforward.
While Baier and Bergstrand (2007) focus on the intensive margin of goods
trade, we would like to emphasize at this point that using panel data with fixed
country-pair effects and a binary indicator variable to estimate effects at the
extensive country margin of trade is done here for completeness. It turns out
that the Baier–Bergstrand approach in context of the extensive margin is not
trustworthy with long panels of country-pairs for the following reason. The
dependent variable in this case is a binary indicator. This indicator is zero for
39% of the observations between 1960 and 2005, and it is unity more likely in
recent years (for 77.6% of the country-pairs in 2005 versus 42.8% in 1960).
Clearly, the fixed country-pair effects estimator identifies the coefficient only from
those country-pairs that (i) switched export status and (ii) switched treaty status
between 1960 and 2005. These are only 10.8% of the observations. And for those
observations, the estimator does not guarantee to obtain predictions in the interval
[0,1], so that estimated probabilities may be biased. In contrast, the matching
approach entertains variation from all 16,050 country-pairs in 2005, so that the
estimates are less comparable between thematching estimator and the fixed effects
estimator for the extensive margin than they are for the intensive margin, where
both estimators are based on an identical number of observations on outcome.
In viewof the aforementioned limitations of linearmodeling, it seemsdesirable to
move on to nonparametric identification along the lines of Section 2. Before summar-
izing the findings, let us emphasize that the less restrictive functional form assump-
tions and cleaner identification in comparison to fixed effectsmodeling renders global
comparisons of effects more difficult, since the support which is common to a
comparison of observations with one or the other scope of preferentialism differs
between different treatment and control states. One consequence of the latter is also
that average treatment effects of the treatedmay differ from average treatment effects
of the untreated (and of average treatment effects as a weighted average of the two).
Tables 7 and 8 summarize the estimates of ATTIs;~s and ATT
E
s;~s and their standard
errors. In both tables, we focus on data of 2005 to ensure that treated observations
are matched onto ones of the same year. The corresponding results should be
interpreted as ones where the change in propensity scores since the beginning
(1960) until the end of the sample period (2005) is the same between treated and
control units, and the estimated effects are associated with changes in treatment.12
12 Suppose that the propensity of having any scope other than 0 is zero in some initial period.
Then, the level of propensity of having a given scope greater than 0 in a later period does
represent not only the propensity of having that state but also the change in propensity relative
to the initial period.
724 P. Egger and G. Wamser
In this sense, we may refer to these estimates as long-run effects. The results for the
intensive margin indicate that a larger extent of preferentialism is generally asso-
ciated with positive effects on goods trade. This can easily be seen by comparing
the respective ATTs in Table 7. First, the elements above the principal diagonal in
Table 7 indicate that there is less trade on average with a narrower scope of
preferentialism for treated relative to control units. The elements below the
Table 7: ATTs at intensive export margin.
Treatment scope Control scope of preferentialism
0 1 2 3 4
0 · −1.012*** −1.046*** −2.829*** −3.176***
· (0.040) (0.046) (0.061) (0.093)
1 1.169*** · −0.283*** −1.278*** −1.697***
(0.068) · (0.065) (0.071) (0.082)
2 1.714*** 0.467*** · −0.592*** −0.947***
(0.103) (0.092) · (0.073) (0.077)
3 2.336*** 1.128*** 0.547*** · −0.395***
(0.165) (0.144) (0.116) · (0.093)
4 2.724*** 1.439*** 1.011*** 0.424** ·
(0.349) (0.298) (0.224) (0.167) ·
Notes: ATTs and standard errors (in parentheses) on the log of bilateral goods exports (intensive
margin) in 2005. ***, **, and * indicate that coefficients are significantly different from zero at 1%,
5%, and 10%, respectively.
Table 8: ATTs at extensive export margin.
Treatment scope Control scope of preferentialism
0 1 2 3 4
0 · −0.113*** −0.114*** −0.079*** −0.062***
· (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008)
1 0.062*** · −0.016*** −0.011* −0.014**
(0.007) · (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
2 0.058*** 0.015** · 0.006** ·
(0.009) (0.007) · (0.002) ·
3 0.050*** 0.013 −0.003 · −0.002
(0.013) (0.008) (0.003) · (0.003)
4 0.075* 0.013 0.000 0.002 ·
(0.039) (0.022) (0.008) (0.005) ·
Notes: ATTs and standard errors (in parentheses) on the probability of positive bilateral goods
exports (extensive margin) in 2005. ***, **, and * indicate that coefficients are significantly different
from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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principal diagonal in Table 7 indicate that the opposite is true on average with a
broader scope of preferentialism for treated relative to control units. The matrices in
Tables 7 and 8 are not symmetric which suggests that the ATTs differ from average
treatment effects of the untreated due to differences in the support. The latter point
is highlighted in Figure 4, which depicts the matrix of estimated ATTs presented in
Table 7 in a three-dimensional histogram. In this histogram, the horizontal axes
display the treatment scope and the control scope. On the vertical axis, we display
the log of bilateral goods exports. The tallest blue bar in the back indicates the
effect of covering preferential market access through four modes of PEIAs relative
to a situation without any preferential market access. The staircase on the right-
hand side in the back indicates, for example, how goods exports are affected when
first implementing one PEIA (orange), then adding another one (green), a third one
(light blue), and a fourth one (dark blue).
Second, for a given treatment scope (row) in the upper bloc of Table 7, the
estimated ATTs tend to increase in absolute value as we move away from the
principal diagonal. Thus, the effects of a broader scope of preferentialism on the
level of positive trade gradually increase with a broader scope of the treated
relative to the control pairs. As said before, this has to be interpreted with some
care since the effect of increasing the scope from, say, 0 to 1 is based on a
different support for control units with a treatment of 0 in the data than the
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Figure 4: ATTs at intensive export margin.
Notes: The figure depicts the matrix of estimated ATTs presented in Table 7.
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effect of increasing the scope from, say, 0 to 2, etc. In principal, this feature
could be removed by enforcing the support for the control treatment to be the
same across all comparisons, but this comes at the cost of a potentially high
efficiency loss.
Broadening the scope of preferentialism raises both margins of trade.
However, it seems to matter in particular at the intensive margin of trade (in
Table 7), but less so at the extensive margin of trade (in Table 8). For the latter
statement, the issue of support is particularly important since all observations
with zero bilateral exports are excluded from the support underlying the ATTs at
the intensive margin in Table 7.
With respect to the extensive margin, results broadly confirm the pattern
found for the intensive margin, in contrast to the linear probability models in
Tables 5 and 6. Apart from some insignificant ATTs estimated for treatment
scopes 3 and 4 (for control scopes 1– 3, respectively), treatments with a higher
degree of integration increase the probability of country-pairs trading goods.
Negative ATTs are found for combinations where the control scope exceeds the
treatment scope, except for ATTE
2;~3
¼ 0:006, which is, however, a relatively small
effect. On average, focusing on a control scope of 0, a higher treatment scope of
any kind and of any extent leads to an ~6% higher probability of country-pairs
to exchange goods.13
We assessed the sensitivity of these findings in three substantial ways. First,
we utilized an alternative classification of investment agreements to the bench-
mark results as in the second column of Table 4 and based matching on the
associated propensity scores. The results turned out to be qualitatively insensi-
tive to this change. Second, we estimated ATTIs;~s and ATT
E
s;~s based on the
propensity scores from a dynamic model as in the third column of Table 4.
Again, the qualitative insights from Tables 7 and 8 were unchanged when using
this more complicated approach relative to the more parsimonious one
described above. Third, we estimated ATTIs;~s and ATT
E
s;~s based on a model
including the weighted scope of preferentialism in other countries than i and j
in the previous year, as in Table 4. In all conducted sensitivity checks, the
13 Notice that, following Lechner (2001), one may compute average treatment effects — say,
ATEIs;~s and ATE
E
s;~s – based on the results reported in Tables 7 and 8, which can be compared to
the scope-specific average treatment effects in Tables 5 and 6. In Table 9, we do so for the
intensive margin of trade ATEIs;~s. Besides these scope-dyad-specific ATEs, we report scope-
specific average treatment effects ATEIs in the same table. The latter can be compared with
the results on the scope-specific average treatment effects on the intensive margin of exports in
Tables 5 and 6. The findings suggest that the average treatment effect of broadening the scope
depends on the initial state of liberalization, which is not accounted for in the estimates in
Tables 5 and 6.
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qualitative insights from the analysis in Tables 7 and 8 were unchanged. The
reason for the qualitative insensitivity of the results to those changes is that the
estimated propensity scores are relatively similar for the year 2005 across the
different experiments. Hence, the treatment and control groups are similar and
so are the estimated average treatment effects on the treated.
4 Conclusions
There is a long-standing tradition in empirical work on the effects of preferential
economic policy effects on economic outcomes in adopting a unimodal
approach: GTAs affect goods trade, STAs affect services trade, and foreign
investment provisions affect foreign direct investment. In reality, especially
large firms pursue an array of interdependent activities which cover goods and
services trade as well as foreign direct investments. This makes cross-issue
effects likely, leading to responses of goods trade not only to preferentialism
in the goods domain but also to preferentialism in the services and investment
domains.
This paper provides evidence of such effects by focusing on the scope of
preferentialism in four domains: goods trade, services trade, investment by way
of DTTs. It documents generally positive effects from broadening the scope of
Table 9: Scope-dyad-specific (ATEIs;~s) and scope-specific (ATE
I
s ) ATEs at intensive export margin
based on findings in table 7.
Treatment scope Control scope of preferentialism ATEIs
0 1 2 3
0 · · · · ·
· · · · ·
1 1.051*** · · · 1.051***
(0.048) · · · (0.048)
2 1.129*** 0.338*** · · 0.895***
(0.056) (0.074) · · (0.062)
3 2.772*** 1.258*** 0.579*** · 1.781***
(0.081) (0.085) (0.087) · (0.083)
4 3.144*** 0.921*** 0.954*** 0.402*** 1.567***
(0.130) (0.101) (0.105) (0.116) (0.113)
Notes: Average treatment effects (ATEs) and standard errors (in parentheses) on the probability of
positive bilateral goods exports (extensive margin) in 2005. ***, **, and * indicate that coefficients
are significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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preferentialism by granting preferential market access beyond zero, in one, two,
etc., dimensions.
Data show that countries often start their path of preferentialism by granting
market access either for investment (through investment or tax provisions) or for
goods trade, and only some of the countries continue to integrate beyond the
scope of one. The findings in this article suggest that the average country-pair
gains from broadening the scope of preferentialism beyond one-dimensional
forms.
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